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Banks in countries with currency board arrangements are exposed to the risk of 
illiquidity in their national currency, which is driven by currency board stability. 
In line with liquidity risk appetite, banks need to restrict their own risk exposure 
with a limit on minimum liquidity position in the national currency. This paper 
presents mathematical derivations of a limit on minimum liquidity position in the 
national currency, which depends on the business environment and on the 
currency structure of the balance sheet. Algebraic calculation in this paper is of 





Recent business environment is demanding for corporations, due to the 
reduced aggregate demand and income. Decreased income and reduced 
creditworthiness of corporations is also reflected in reduced creditworthiness of 
the government. Sovereign risk in this case increases as reduced income of 
corporations reduces tax basis and, consequently, taxes, which are income of 
the state budget. If a country uses currency board arrangement, then increased 
sovereign risk endangers the stability of the currency board, as higher sovereign 
risk reduces opportunities for raising new governmental debt which increases 
the probability of reducing foreign exchange reserves (Ganevet al, 2012). 
 
                                                           
*
 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Raiffeisen Bank International AG. 
**
 Prof. Srečko Devjak, PhD, Raiffeisen Bank International AG, Am Stadtpark 9, 1030 Vienna, 
Austria, Phone: +43 1 71707-5698, Fax: +43 1 71707-765698, E-mail: srecko.devjak@ 
rbinternational.com 
Management, Vol. 19, 2014, 1, pp. 45-60 
S. Devjak: Banks in currency board systems and limit on minimum liquidity position in…  
46 
Endangered stability of the currency board raises the liquidity risk in banks 
as clients prefer reserve currency to national currency. This, on the one hand, 
reduces stickiness and rollovers of deposits, and on the other shortens the 
expected maturity of deposits without contractual maturity. Both reasons deliver 
net outflows of deposits from a bank. A bank in a banking system with currency 
board should therefore monitor stability of the currency board and consequently 
build results of corresponding analysis in its liquidity risk management system. 
 
The goal of this paper is to show how a bank can set a position limit and 
control its exposure to liquidity risk, which is driven by the stability of a 
currency board. The limit will be calculated with mathematical derivation from 
ratios for measurement of currency board stability. After showing the ratios for 
measurement of currency board stability, this paper explains the 
multicollinearity among them and calculates the limit on minimum liquidity 
position in the national currency. The limit on minimum liquidity position in the 
national currency will only be calculated algebraically. Calculating the absolute 
limit based on sample data is left to individual banks as the sample data of each 
bank is confidential and therefore not available to the public. A review of the 
existing literature shows that no paper explains the derivation of a non-
regulatory liquidity limit. Unlike the existing literature, this paper explicitly 
explains how it is possible to calculate a limit on a minimum liquidity position 
in the national currency. This is what makes this paper original. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Currently, there are two countries in Europe that have currency board 
arrangements. These are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Estonia and 
Latvia had currency board arrangements in the past, but now both countries are 
a part of the Euro area. This is an expected consequence if we take into account 
that currency boards have been suggested as the proper exchange rate regime 
for potential European union (EU) and European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) entry countries (de Haan et al., 2001). This was also confirmed 
by Minea and Rault (2011) research results on the currency board in Bulgaria. 
They concluded that adopting the currency board may have worked as a rather 
good device for integrating Bulgaria into the EMU. 
 
The history of currency board systems since 1990 has shown that this 
special form of the exchange rate system can ease the consequences of financial 
shocks and can help to stabilize the economy after currency crises. The history 
has shown that the introducing a currency board system can deliver high 
credibility to the national currency and consequently reduce inflation rate, 
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which was experienced by some countries not having considerable experience 
in central banking like Estonia and Lithuania (Grimm, 2007). Based on the data 
from Bulgaria, Carlson and Valev (2001) showed that a currency board system 
in general reduces the expected inflation, but to various degrees for different 
agents. Differences exist as agents differently trust the disinflation rhetoric of 
the policymakers who are not equally familiar with the operation of the 
currency board. 
 
A currency board can encourage fiscal discipline. If the fiscal authorities 
know that the budget deficit cannot be monetized, their incentives to have large 
deficits will be reduced (de Haan, et al., 2001). 
 
The main disadvantage of currency board arrangements is the loss of 
independent monetary policy. Countries with currency board arrangements deal 
with loss of Central Bank functions which are especially important in case of 
problems with liquidity in the banking sector. They are not able to supply extra 
liquidity to the banking system or individual banks (Ganič, 2012).The loss of 
the lender of last resort function of the central bank can mean the loss of a 
safety net for the financial sector. The national authorities in this case should 
ensure that financial institutions have adequate capital and access to credit 
markets abroad. The absence of the lender of last resort function of the central 
bank reduces the moral hazard problem of banking management and/or 
supervision, because if banks are in difficulties, there is no one to save them. 
Automatic access to liquidity can be facilitated by using reserve requirements as 
introduced in a number of currency board arrangement countries (de Haan et al., 
2001). To remain confident in the currency board, foreign exchange reserves 
should be sufficient to cover outstanding value of relevant liabilities at the 
chosen exchange rate. Where confidence is lacking, this proportion needs to be 
100 percent (Bennett, 1993). Under the currency board system, unlike the 
practice when a country has a central bank, the commercial banks may be 
allowed or required to hold a significant part or all of their reserves 
denominated in the reserve currency (Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2013). 
 
Nenovsky and Hristov (2002) explain the new generation of currency 
boards, which, to varying degrees, preserve the ability of the central bank to 
function as the lender of last resort and to intervene in case of a systemic risk. 
Such currency board existed in Argentina, Estonia and Lithuania, and still exists 
in Hong Kong and Bulgaria. The introduction of this second-generation 
currency board offers an opportunity to conduct monetary policy, which does 
not have its typical image. 
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Chobanov and Nenovsky (2004) claim that currency boards and golden 
standard as monetary regimes have a number of similarities. Besides credibility 
and confidence, there are two additional similarities. First, there is the automatic 
mechanism which links money demand and supply to the balance of payments 
and leads to a relatively quick adjustment of emerging imbalances in the 
economy. Automatism means that the balance is adjusted (restored) after a 
shock without the intervention of a central monetary authority. Automatic 
mechanism requires flexibility especially in the interbank money market. 
Second, both monetary regimes significantly constrain the domestic economic 
policies. 
 
Frank (2004) describes several conditions that make a currency board 
sustainable. A country with a currency board has to abandon the independent 
monetary policy and has to duplicate the country’s monetary policy with the 
anchor currency. The most important feature of the anchor currency is its 
stability, so the country should choose one of the major currencies for the 
anchor currency, which is also the national currency of their trade partner. 
Furthermore, countries need to implement a new regime in the national 
legislation as it is very important that the monetary authority and the 
government tie themselves to the currency board regime. Due to the absence of 
the lender of last resort function, adequate regulation of the financial sector 
should be ensured. With proper regulation, the need for the lender of last resort 
function will not appear. Another condition is labor market flexibility.  
 
Frank (2004) states that, if the anchor currency appreciates, wages should 
fall, in order to keep foreign prices and competitiveness of the domestic 
industry unchanged. Gurtner (2004) states that a candidate country for a 
currency board should not be subject to massive and frequent terms of trade 
shocks (demand shock in trading partner should have limited effect on the 
domestic export industry). So,the country should have several trading partners 
and distribute its exports among them. In addition, low debt of the government 
is necessary to ensure the sustainability of the currency board. Frank (2004) 
states that, when default must be taken into consideration, interest rates soar and 
it becomes increasingly difficult to refinance the country’s debt. Thus, a firm 
commitment to budget balance by the government is highly important. 
 
If a country does not take into account all the conditions mentioned above, 
it is probable that the currency board will collapse. This happened in 2002 to 
Argentina, although it had had a successful currency board arrangement for 
more than ten years. The currency board in Argentina collapsed mainly due to 
fiscal policy and the devaluation of the national currency in Brazil. Frank 
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(2004) stated that fiscal policy in Argentina was one of the central issues 
leading to the breakdown of the currency board, especially the imperfect fiscal 
policy and difficult international financial environment. The financial 
environment changed when in the early 1999 Brazil, Argentina’s main and most 
important trading partner, abandoned its peg to the USD and left BRL floating. 
There is a recommendation that a major part of the country’s trade should be 
with the anchor economy. Argentina chose the USD as an anchor currency, 
mostly because of its stability. The devaluation of BRL made Argentinean 
goods much more expensive in Brazil, leading to the negative shock with 
Argentina’s most important trading partner. Argentina could have responded 
with labor market reforms. Gurtner (2004) argues that the flexibility of the labor 
market is the key to the currency board sustainability. Mulino (2002) proves the 
same with a second generation model. A currency board system can become 
vulnerable to a currency crisis in case of unemployment persistence. However, 
labor markets in Argentina were highly inflexible during the currency board era. 
Depreciation of BRL against ARS became a growing problem and government 
was unable to enforce labor market reforms against the pressure of the unions. 
 
3. LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT IN BANKS AND 
COLLAPSE OF A CURRENCY BOARD 
 
Determinants of liquidity in the bank were investigated by several authors. 
Vodova (2011) identified determinants of liquidity in Czech commercial banks. 
The determinants of liquidity were identified using bank specific data and were 
empirically based on macroeconomic data over the period from 2001 to 2009. A 
multiple regression model shows liquidity of a bank is, on the one hand 
positively related to capital adequacy, interest rates on loans, share of non-
performing loans and interest rate on interbank transaction, but on the other 
hand negatively related to inflation rate, business cycle and financial crisis. 
Relation between size of banks and their liquidity is ambiguous. The 
determinants of liquidity of Slovak commercial banks were explained in 
Vodova (2012). The determinants of liquidity of commercial banks in Romania 
were identified by Munteanu (2012).  
 
A multivariate regression model shows the crisis brought about substantial 
changes in the structure of bank liquidity determinants. In times of crisis, the 
fraction of macroeconomic determinants increases and the fraction of bank 
specific determinants decreases. De Haan and van den End (2013) explain using 
empirical analysis that the banks usually hold more liquid assets against their 
stock of liquid liabilities as required by the regulation. Banks with stronger 
capital position hold less liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, 
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which shows an interaction between capital and liquidity buffers. However, this 
interaction appears to be weaker during a crisis because of the impact of crisis 
on portfolio of the bank that consequently makes the capital of the bank 
questionable. This is confirmed by the experience of banks in Argentina. 
 
During the crisis in 2001, the banks in Argentina had many liquidity issues. 
The banking sector functioned mainly in USD, so the banks had short term 
liabilities mainly in USD. At the same time, the stock of liquid assets in USD by 
banks and the stock of international reserves in USD were not enough to cover 
the financial liabilities of the consolidated financial system. And moreover, the 
lender of last resort was not available (Kiguel, 2011). People realized that there 
were not enough USD in the system to cover all the deposits and between July 
and November 2001 they withdrew around 15 billion USD from the banks. 
Three national banks (Banco de Galicia, Banco de la Nación and Banco de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires) were particularly affected. To save them, the 
government set a cap of 1,000 USD on bank withdrawals per customer per 
month. This decision pushed the people of Argentina to the streets and resulted 
in the collapse of currency board regime (The Economist, 2002). 
 
4. FORMAL CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMENT STABILITY 
CRITERIA 
 
A set of formal currency board arrangement stability criteria is composed of 
eight ratios (Ganevet al, 2012): 
 
1. FX reserve coverage of the monetary base. Within an orthodox 
currency board there should be notes and coins in circulation (monetary 
aggregate M0) covered by reserve currency. The bigger the difference 
between FX reserves and M0, the greater the stability of the currency 
board. Bulgaria decided that FX reserves in euros should not only cover 
M0, but also bank reserves at the Central Bank.  
 
2. FX reserve (less government deposit) coverage of the monetary 
base. This ratio excludes the government deposits from the FX reserves 
and evaluates the stability of the currency board in case government 
keeps savings outside the Central Bank. The stability of the currency 
board is shown if value of this ratio equals at least 1. An additional 
buffer will increase the stability of the currency board. 
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3. FX reserve coverage of the national currency denominated part of 
M2. The stability of a currency board is also determined by FX reserve 
coverage of the national currency denominated part of M2. This 
indicator roughly measures the percentage of national currency 
denominated cash and deposits, which could be converted to reserve 
currency in case of a currency crisis. To a great degree, this should also 
be considered an extreme case, as in the event of a currency crisis and 
the following bank runs, the chance that the entire money supply 
(measured by M2) would be converted into reserve currency is very 
small. 
 
4. Ratio between money outside banks and the sum of deposits. If the 
value of this ration increases, the probability of quick conversion of the 
national currency into reserve currency also increases. A value rise of 
this ratio shows an increasing propensity to raise cash holdings and 
decrease deposits in order to increase the ability of conversion to 
reserve the currency. Consequently, this ratio measures the trust in the 
banking system and in the governmental policy.  
 
5. Significant variation in demand for notes and coins. Currency risk 
exists if we can see higher variability of demand for notes and coins in a 
period compared with variability of the same random variable in the 
preceding period (Ganevet al, 2012). Measures of variability are 
measures of uncertainty and, consequently, measures of risk. Assume 
financial investors are risk averse and assume they demand notes and 
coins in stress free environment on financial markets. Consequently, we 
can assume the probability distribution of daily demand for notes and 
coins is normal and variance can be used as a measure of risk. If d is 
daily demand for notes and coins and if is n the number of days in 
observation, then the variance of daily demand for notes and coins 2ds  is 










































s  (1). 
 
6. Abrupt changes in the currency structure of deposits. Rapid 
replacement of deposits denominated from the national to reserve 
currency indicates fear of financial investors and presence of currency 
risk (Ganevet al, 2012). If a fraction of deposits in the national currency 
follows a monotonous upward trend in time, then we can conclude that 
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financial investors estimate the currency risk is reducing. If a fraction of 
deposits in the national currency remains unchanged in time, then we 
can conclude that financial investors estimate the currency risk as 
stable. Finally, if a fraction of deposits in the national currency follows 
a monotonous downward trend in time, then we can conclude that 
financial investors estimate currency risk is rising and the stability of 
currency board is reducing. 
 
7. Balance of payments dynamics. Changes in the balance of payments 
are directly reflected in the changes of the FX reserves volume. The 
deficit in the balance of payments reduces the amount of the FX 
reserves and the surplus in the balance of payments increases the 
amount of the FX reserves. The tendency to deficit in balance of 
payments will in time result in the reduction of the FX reserves. If ix is 
the amount of deficit in year i, if jy is the amount of surplus in year j 












8. Budget deficits unmatched by financing outside the fiscal reserve. 
The inability to raise government debt forces a country to reduce FX 
reserves and to use government reserves for financing the budget 
deficit. The reduction of FX reserves increases currency risk and 
reduces the stability of the currency board (Ganevet al, 2012).  
 
5. CALCULATION OF A LIMIT ON LIQUIDITY POSITION IN 
THE NATIONAL CURRENCY  
 
Liquidity risk consists of several risk categories. One of the categories is 
the risk of currency board stability. To calculate the minimum liquidity position 
in  the national currency, we will assume that the stability of a currency board is 
the only driver of liquidity risk. We will ignore all other categories of liquidity 
risk. 
 
The stability of a currency board is also determined with FX reserve 
coverage of the national currency denominated part of M2. This ratio roughly 
measures the percentage of national currency denominated cash and deposits, 
which could be converted to reserve currency in case of a currency crisis. To a 
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great degree, this should also be considered an extreme case, as in the case of 
currency crisis and bank runs, the chance that the entire money supply 
(measured by M2) would be converted to reserve currency is very small 
(Ganevet al, 2012).  
 
Assume this ratio is an ultimate measure of the currency board stability. 
Let M2 (LCY) be the national currency denominated part of M2 and let FXR 
(RCY) be the amount of FX reserves in reserve currency. Also assume, the 









Before we calculate the limit on the national currency liquidity steering in a 
bank, we need to redefine macroeconomic ratio on a microeconomic level 
within a banking system. IMF (2013) defines foreign exchange reserve as assets 
of the central bank for covering its liabilities. Foreign exchange reserve can be 
denominated in currencies, which do not include the national currency as the 
central bank cannot have a claim to itself. If A (RCY) are assets of a 
commercial bank in reserve currency, then a commercial bank holds: 
 
( ) ( )RCYARCYFXR =  (4). 
 
. The proper level of foreign exchange reserves is explained in several 
papers, for example IMF (2001), IMF (2011), de Beaufort Wijnholds and 
Kapteyn (2001) and Roger (1993). 
 
As explained by Mishkin and Eakins (1999),  liabilities of the central bank 
are composed of currency in circulation and of bank reserves with the central 
bank. The currency in circulation is equivalent to current accounts in 
commercial banks as is currency in circulation immediate obligation of the 
central bank to the holder of the national currency. Bank reserves are the 
liability of the central bank, which is similar to term deposits in commercial 
banks as bank reserves are obligatory for banks. 
 
Let D(LCY) be the deposits of a commercial bank in the national currency. 
Then for a commercial bank holds ( ) ( )LCYDLCYM =2 , and along with 
equation (4), also: 
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( ) ( )LCYDaTALCYA ⋅−=  (10), 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LCYDLCYDaTALCYDLCYA −⋅−=−  (11), 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LCYDaTALCYDLCYA ⋅+−=− 1  (12). 
 
The last equation holds for all maturities on the balance sheet level. If 
( )LCYAi  is an inflow on time interval i and if ( )LCYDi  is an outflow on time 
interval i, then on the total balance sheet level holds: 
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Banks usually want to keep accumulated net cash flows ceteris paribus 
above the absolute limit up to and including time interval nN < . Therefore, it 
holds: 
 










1  (14). 
 
Let y be the stability of a currency board. If 1x  is FX reserve coverage of 
the monetary base, then 2x is FX reserve less government deposit coverage of 
the monetary base, 3x  is FX reserve coverage of the national currency 
denominated part of M2, 4x  is the ratio of money outside banks to the sum of 
deposits, 5x  is significant variation in demand for notes and coins, 6x  are the 
abrupt changes in the currency structure of deposits, 7x  is the balance of 
payments dynamics, and 8x  are budget deficits unmatched by financing outside 












Assume that multicollinearity exists, such that holds: 
 










kk x φλ  (17). 
 
In equations (16) and (17), mϕ  and nφ  are stochastic terms and 
821 ,...,, λλλ are constants. When calculating liquidity limit we have to use the 
largest volume of information about currency board stability possible. With this, 
we make sure y as a coherent risk measure of currency board stability is 
reflected in the limit. The coherency of risk measure y is proven with 
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coefficient of determination if independent variables in the regression model 
explain the majority of dependent variable variability. 
 
Based on the assumption of multicollinearity among independent variables, 
FX reserve coverage of the national currency denominated part of M2 ratio has 
to be combined with any variable { }8,7,6,5,4∈∀kxk at calculation of the 
liquidity limit. If partial correlation coefficient between any independent 
variable is { }8,7,6,5,4∈∀kxk  and y  is the highest for abrupt changes in the 
currency structure of deposits, then abrupt changes in the currency structure of 
deposits should be used along with FX reserve coverage of the national 
currency denominated part of M2 at calculation of the liquidity limit.  
 
Currency board stability is defined with a situation in business environment 
of a bank, therefore, there should be a liquidity limit calculation in the bank 
linked to a situation in the business environment of the bank. The higher 
currency board stability, the higher can be the bank limit on liquidity position in 
the national currency. Similarly, the lower currency board stability, the lower 
may be limit on liquidity position in the national currency. As we can see the 
currency board stability and the limit on liquidity position in the national 
currency are in a linear relationship. 
 
The deposits in a banking system are composed of deposits in the national 
currency and deposits in other currencies. The deposits in the national currency 
are labeled with g and those in other currencies with h. Then, the fraction of 






As it holds:  
 










1  (18), 







1  is a limit value in the case of full stability of 
the currency board, then the limit value in the case of partial stability of 
currency board equals: 
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1  (19). 
 
If 0→g  then: 
 







































g  (20). 
 
The derivation above confirms that the appropriate limit on minimum 
liquidity position in the national currency is zero in case there is no stability of 
currency board. If there is no stability of currency board, then financial 
investors hold no deposits with banks in the national currency. All deposits they 
hold with banks are deposits, denominated in the reserve currency. 
 
And if 0→h  then: 
 







































1lim  (21), 
 



























11lim  (22). 
 
The last equation shows the appropriate limit on minimum liquidity 
position in the national currency in the case of a full stability of the currency 







1 . If the full stability of currency board 
exists, then financial investors fully trust the national currency and all deposits 
they have with the banks are denominated in the national currency only. The 
amount of deposits in other currencies is therefore zero. The same is also clearly 




The stability of a currency board can be identified with a set of ratios. This 
paper shows that the measurement of currency board stability is possible with a 
risk measure, which is a dependent variable of a sample regression model with 
ratios for identifying currency board stability as independent variables. The 
coherency of such a risk measure is proven with the coefficient of determination 
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if independent variables in the regression model explain the majority of 
dependent variable variability. 
 
A sample regression model should not include multicollinearity. Therefore, 
not all ratios for identification of currency board stability can be included into 
the sample regression model. Consequently, in the sample regression model 
ratios with insignificant additional information about currency board stability 
are not included.  
 
Mathematical derivation shows it is possible for a bank to calculate a limit 
on minimum liquidity position in the national currency out of ratios for 
identifying currency board stability. When calculating liquidity limit, the largest 
possible volume of information about currency board stability should be used. 
This assures the risk measure for measurement of currency board stability is 
reflected in the limit. The result of algebraic calculation confirms a linear 
relationship between currency board stability and the limit on minimum 
liquidity position in the national currency. The higher currency board stability, 
the higher can be the bank limit on liquidity position in the national currency. 
Similarly, the lower currency board stability, the lower may be limit on liquidity 
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BANKE U SUSTAVU VALUTNOG ODBORA I LIMIT NA MINIMALNU 




Banke u državama s valutnim odborom izložene su riziku nelikvidnosti u nacionalnoj 
valuti, a koja ovisi o stabilnosti aranžmana. U skladu s apetitima u preuzimanju rizika 
likvidnosti, banke trebaju ograničiti vlastitu izloženost riziku, koristeći limit na 
minimalnu likvidnosnu poziciju u nacionalnoj valuti. U ovom se radu prezentiraju 
matematički izvodi minimalne likvidne pozicije u nacionalnoj valuti, u ovisnosti od 
poslovnog okruženja i valutne strukture bilance. Algebarski izračun, prezentiran u radu, 
od posebnog je interesa za banke, koje posluju u uvjetima valutnog odbora. 
